Me and my group of three other skiers were skiing the North/Northeast aspect of rocky point above the saddle of Catherines Pass. We had been skiing the zone all morning along with a few other skiers. We had taken three laps up the short pitch and I was going to ski a line that two other members of our group had skied the lap before.

The line was estimated to be 35 degrees at the point of entry and gradually flattened out toward the apron of the chute. The chute we selected to ski had a steep drop in with a right footed turn that pointed you down a small chute estimated to be 10-15 feet wide. To the skiers right of the chute ran another short chute that was directly down the fall line and more eastern facing than the aspect we selected to ski. As I dropped in I made a right footed turn on the spine between he two chutes. This was the third track set in the chute and was the furthest toward the fall line and below the other two tracks from my group members the lap before.

The drop in had clearly been wind-loaded at the top and was sitting on top of the faceted layer we are seeing throughout the snow pack. As I made my right footed turn to enter the chute that was my path into the apron the PWL failed below me and above me, estimated to be two feet deep and roughly 30' wide. The layer ripped to the ground as the angle was estimated to be above 35 degrees. I was moving faster than the slide and did not get pulled in any direction and was already moving through the chute before the snow behind me started to move down the fall line. The avalanche ran directly down the chute to my right and was probably 200' behind me.

The avalanche ran directly down the chute to my right (skiers right).

Two of my group members who had skied a different line were eyes on from the bottom of the objective clear of any terrain traps. The third was behind me watching from the top of the line.

We had all read the report and are experienced in the backcountry. We knew the risks of all north/northeast aspects being especially dangerous with the PWL and possible wind loading. We had skied the line multiple times that day and began to feel more comfortable which was a mistake on our part. Before dropping members of the group had discussed the possibility of the chute to the right of the line sliding and had established a potential slide path. We knew that the speed of us skiing the chute would put us ahead of any potential slides, however, that was the wrong decision.

While we assessed the risk correctly before hand, the fact that we pointed out a potential turn that could trigger a slide should have been enough to pull back and not ski the line.